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Meijer: News from the International Criminal Tribunals

NEWS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
Part I—International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY)*
by Cecile E.M. Meijer*
General
Among the highlights of the year 2001 is the June 28 transfer of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosević to the
UN Detention Unit in The Hague, The Netherlands. During
both his brief initial appearance on July 3, 2001, and the August
30 status conference, Milosević labeled the Tribunal false and
illegal. He has so far declined to appoint an attorney to represent him, and the Trial Chamber has entered a plea of not guilty
on his behalf. In accordance with Rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Registrar appointed three lawyers as
amici curiae in the case on September 6. In its order inviting the
Registrar to make the appointment, the Trial Chamber emphasized that the role of the amici was to assist the court and not to
represent Milosević. So far, the current amended indictment has
charged Milosević with violations of the laws or customs of war
and crimes against humanity committed in Kosovo. In addition,
a separate indictment charges Milosević with crimes against
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws or customs of war in Croatia during the early
years of the Balkan War. Press reports indicate that Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte is preparing another indictment that will
incorporate charges of genocide in Bosnia. A starting date for
Milosević’s trial on the Kosovo charges has been tentatively set
for February 12, 2002.
On an institutional level, several significant developments
have taken place this year. Hans Holthuis assumed his responsibilities as the new Registrar of the ICTY in January 2001.
Beginning March 1, 2001, His Excellency Mohamed El Habib
Fassi Fihri (Morocco) replaced Judge Mohamed Bennouna
(Morocco), who left the Tribunal, as a permanent judge on the
ICTY for the remainder of Judge Bennouna’s term, which ends
November 16, 2001. Since the term of all permanent judges
expires on that same date, the UN General Assembly elected
fourteen new permanent judges for a term of four years, beginning November 17, 2001. Judge Florence Mumba (Zambia)
will be the only woman serving in this capacity. Professor
Theodor Meron will succeed Judge Patricia Wald as the permanent judge from the United States. The UN General Assembly also elected 27 ad litem judges, and from this pool, the UN
Secretary-General appointed six ad litem judges (five of whom
are women) who were each subsequently assigned to new trials
that began in September 2001. Two judges from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda joined the Appeals Chamber common to both tribunals.
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Appeals Chamber
So far this year, the Appeals Chamber has issued three judgements on the merits in ICTY cases: Celebići, Jelisić, and Kupreskić
et al. The appeals judgement in Kupreskić et al. was rendered on
October 23, 2001, and will be discussed in Volume 9, Issue 2 of
the Human Rights Brief. The Appeals Chamber also rendered several Interlocutory Appeals decisions, as well as two judgments
in contempt cases.
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Celebići Judgement
On February 20, 2001, the Appeals Chamber pronounced its
judgement in Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić (aka
“Pavo”), Hazim Delić, and Esad Landzo (aka “Zenga”), commonly

v

known as the Celebići case (Case No. IT-96-21-A). The indictment
had charged the four accused with grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions (Article 2 of the ICTY Statute) and violations of the
laws or customs of war (Article 3 of the ICTY Statute) for alleged
criminal actions, which included murder, torture, and inhuman
treatment committed against Bosnian Serb detainees in a prison
camp near Celebići. The accused were held accountable on the
basis of personal and/or superior responsibility, in accordance
with Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. In November
1998, the Trial Chamber acquitted Delalić but found the other
three guilty on various counts, and subsequently sentenced
them to 7, 20, and 15 years of imprisonment, respectively.
The defendants (individually and jointly) and the Prosecution appealed on numerous grounds. The grounds of appeal
included matters relating to Articles 2 and 3 of the ICTY Statute,
superior (command) responsibility, and multiple convictions
based on the same facts.
v

Grounds Pertaining to Articles 2 and 3 of the ICTY Statute
The Tribunal examined the grounds of appeal pertaining to
the grave breaches provision of Article 2 of the ICTY Statute, in
particular relating to the requirements that the armed conflict
be international in character, and that the victims be “protected persons” within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. First, the Tribunal rejected the argument that the armed
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time relevant to the
indictment was not of an international character. The Appeals
Chamber confirmed that the “overall control” test as enunciated
in the 1999 Tadić appeals judgement was the proper test to
apply in determining whether the armed conflict was international in character. Further, it found “no cogent reasons in
the interests of justice to depart from this precedent,” which is
the principle for the use of precedents set forth in the Aleksovski
appeals judgement. The Tribunal also opined that the Trial
Chamber’s legal reasoning was consistent with the conclusions
in Tadić, despite the fact that the Trial Chamber judgement was
rendered in 1998, making it impossible to apply formally the
“overall control” test set forth in the 1999 Tadić Appeals Judgement.
Second, the Appeals Chamber looked at the criteria for the
status of protected persons within the meaning of Article 4 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention, as a prerequisite for the applicability of Article 2 of the ICTY Statute. The appellants claimed
that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that the Celebići
camp detainees, although Bosnian Serbs, were not nationals of
Bosnia “for the purposes of the category of persons protected
under Geneva Convention IV.” Again, the Appeals Chamber
agreed with the Tadić ruling on this point of law, and held that
“[i]n today’s ethnic conflicts, the victims may be ‘assimilated’
to the external State involved in the conflict, even if they formally have the same nationality as their captors, for the purposes
of the application of humanitarian law, and of Article 4 of
Geneva Convention IV specifically.” Again, applying the
Aleksovski principle, the court found no reasons to depart from
this ruling. Furthermore, it found that the Trial Chamber’s
legal reasoning, for purposes of the application of internav
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tional humanitarian law before the ICTY, was consistent with the
reasoning in Tadić. Consequently, the Bosnian Serb detainees
were rightly regarded as protected persons for purposes of
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute.
The appellants’ grounds of appeal relating to Article 3 of the
ICTY Statute, i.e., violations of the laws or customs of war, centered around three issues: (1) whether violations of Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are included in Article 3
of the ICTY Statute; (2) whether Common Article 3 imposes individual criminal responsibility; and (3) whether Common Article 3 is applicable to international armed conflicts. The Tribunal
restated the applicable law enunciated largely in the 1995 Tadić
Jurisdiction Decision and determined that there were “no
cogent reasons in the interests of justice” to depart from these
rulings in the present case. Furthermore, it concluded that the
Trial Chamber had applied the correct legal standards in
answering all three questions in the affirmative.
Superior Responsibility
The court next addressed the appeal grounds pertaining to
superior, or command, responsibility. First, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s finding that the principle of
superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute
applies equally to persons with de jure and de facto authority
who have effective control over their subordinates. Second,
the Tribunal dealt with a Prosecution argument regarding the
requirement that a superior-subordinate relationship exist.
The Trial Chamber had ruled that this relationship can be
exercised in a direct or indirect way, as long as there is effective
control of the superior over the subordinate in the sense of the
“material ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct.” On
appeal, the Prosecution argued that this threshold of control
included situations in which a superior was someone who “may
exercise a substantial degree of influence over the perpetrator
or over the entity to which the perpetrator belongs.” The
Appeals Chamber rejected this proposition, stating that exercising substantial influence as a means of control was not a
rule of customary law because it was insufficiently supported by
case law and state practice.
The Appeals Chamber addressed at length the mens rea standard for superior responsibility, especially the requirement
that the superior “knew or had reason to know” that subordinates had committed or were about to commit unlawful acts. The
Prosecution, raising the issue “as a matter of general significance
to the Tribunal’s jurisprudence,” alleged that the Trial Chamber erred in its interpretation of this standard. Without arguing for a strict liability standard, however, the Prosecution questioned whether, aside from actual knowledge on the part of the
commander, the standard included scenarios in which the
superior did not have the needed information “due to dereliction of his duty.” The Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial
Chamber’s interpretation that a superior is criminally responsible on the basis of superior responsibility “only if information
was available to him which would have put him on notice of
offences committed by subordinates.” In other words, for a
commander to have “reason to know” of possible unlawful acts
by subordinates, it suffices to demonstrate that the superior had
“some general information in his possession” putting him on
notice of such acts. The information may be oral or written and
does not need to have “the form of specific reports submitted
pursuant to a monitoring system.” Moreover, the information
does not need to specify the illegal actions. Finally, in order to
incur criminal liability under superior responsibility, the information only needs to be in the superior’s possession, meaning
28

it “needs to have been provided or available” to him; it is not
necessary that he “actually acquainted himself with the information.” In addition, the Appeals Chamber ruled that the
assessment of the mens rea in connection to Article 7(3) of the
ICTY Statute “should be conducted in the specific circumstances of each case, taking into account the specific situation
of the superior concerned at the time in question.”
Cumulative Convictions
The Tribunal also addressed the important issue of whether
cumulative charges and cumulative convictions based on the
same facts are lawful. The Appeals Chamber was brief in ruling
that cumulative charging is permitted.
The Appeals Chamber gave a critical ruling on the possibility
of multiple convictions based on the same underlying facts. The
court held that an accused may be convicted under different provisions of the ICTY Statute for the same conduct, provided that
“each statutory provision involved has a materially distinct element not contained in the other,” i.e., “if it requires proof of a
fact not required by the other.” The Tribunal based this holding on “reasons of fairness” to the accused and “the consideration that only distinct crimes may justify multiple convictions.”
The Appeals Chamber further held that when this first test
fails, the court must decide based on the principle that “the conviction under the more specific provision should be upheld.”
The court applied this two-prong test to the crimes for which
the Trial Chamber had convicted the defendants (willful killing,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health, torture and inhuman treatment under Article 2 of the
ICTY Statute, and murder, cruel treatment, and torture under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute). It concluded with respect to each set
of double convictions that the first prong failed because the particular convictions under Article 2 required that the acts had been
committed against protected persons, which required proof of
facts that were not required for proving the status of an “individual
not taking an active part in the hostilities” under Article 3 of the
Statute. Moreover, the convictions based on Article 3 of the
Statute (e.g., murder) did not require a materially distinct element
that was not required for a conviction under Article 2 of the Statute
(e.g., willful killing). The Appeals Chamber majority continued
its analysis by applying the second prong of the test. It held that
because the crimes under Article 2 of the Statute require an
additional element and, at least with respect to willful killing and
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health, apply more specifically to the case, the convictions under
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute (the grave breaches provision) must
be upheld and the convictions under Article 3 of the Statute (violations of the laws or customs of war) be dismissed. The issue of
what consequences this decision would have on the imposed
sentences was left to the Trial Chamber, and the Appeals Chamber remitted a possible adjustment of sentences to a newly constituted Trial Chamber.
Both Presiding Judge David Hunt (Australia) and Judge
Bennouna dissented in a joint Separate and Dissenting Opinion. In particular, they disagreed with the majority on the manner in which the first prong of the test should be applied, and
what elements should be weighed in the “different elements”
test. Both judges opined that the test should only take into
account “the substantive elements which relate to an accused’s
conduct, including his mental state.” Thus, the actus reus and
mens rea of the specific offense charged should be considered,
but not the legal prerequisites and contextual elements. Similarly, the judges argued that the second prong test should
reflect specificity, i.e., “the crime which more specifically
describes what the accused actually did in the circumstances of the
particular case.” In other words, all elements of the crime and
continued on next page

Meijer: News from the International Criminal Tribunals
ICTY, continued from previous page

the concrete circumstances of the case should be included
when determining what provision most fits the criminal conduct.
In their dissenting opinion, both judges also disagreed with the
majority’s wording in the disposition, i.e., their simple dismissal
of certain charges. They opined that in cases carrying potential
cumulative convictions, the disposition should read “[n]ot
guilty on the basis that a conviction on this charge would be
impermissibly cumulative.”
Jelisić Judgement
On July 5, 2001, the Appeals Chamber rendered its judgement in Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić (Case No. IT-95-10-A), following appeals filed against the Trial Chamber’s oral judgement of
October 19, 1999 and its written judgement of December 14,
1999. The Trial Chamber had found Jelisić guilty of 31 counts
of violations of the laws or customs of war (murder, cruel treatment, and plunder) and crimes against humanity (murder and
inhumane acts), following a guilty plea. It had sentenced Jelisić
(who called himself the “Serb Adolf”) to 40 years’ imprisonment.
Because Jelisić had not pleaded guilty to genocide, a trial on this
count followed. The Trial Chamber acquitted him on this count
halfway through the trial, however, pursuant to Rule 98bis(B)
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Both the Prosecution and Jelisić appealed. Among the most
significant grounds of appeal were the Prosecution’s appeal of
various aspects of Jelisić’s acquittal for genocide, as well as the
latter’s appeal contesting the sentence. The Appeals Chamber
made important pronouncements on the meaning of intent to
commit genocide, and furthermore held that the Trial Chamber had erred in its interpretation of Rule 98bis(B). Nonetheless, the majority considered it inappropriate, given the circumstances of the case, to remit the case for further proceedings,
and declined to reverse Jelisić’s acquittal on the genocide count.
As for Jelisić’s appeal against the sentence, the Appeals Chamber unanimously affirmed the 40-year sentence.
One of the Prosecution’s grounds for appeal dealt with the
mens rea required for genocide. In this realm, the Appeals
Chamber made pivotal determinations vis-à-vis the specific
intent of the perpetrator, stating that: (1) specific intent requires
that, by performing one of the prohibited acts mentioned in Article 4 of the ICTY Statute, the perpetrator “seeks to achieve the
destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such;” (2) proof of this specific intent may
be direct or indirect (inferred from certain facts and circumstances); and (3) a plan or policy to commit genocide is not a
“legal ingredient” of the crime, but can be an important factor
in proving specific intent.
Another critical issue before the Tribunal was the interpretation of Rule 98bis(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
which requires a Trial Chamber to enter, proprio motu, a judgement
of acquittal “if it finds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain
a conviction” on a particular charge. In particular, the Appeals
Chamber examined the standard for determining whether there
is sufficient evidence. The Tribunal looked at previous ICTY case
law and concluded that the Trial Chamber had used an incorrect
standard. Quoting from the February 2001 appeals judgement in
the Celebići case, the Appeals Chamber held that the proper test
was “whether there is evidence (if accepted) upon which a reasonable Tribunal of fact could be satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused on the particular charge in
question.” In other words, it is not determinative whether a trier
of fact would come to a certain conclusion beyond reasonable
doubt, but whether it could come to such a conclusion.
The Appeals Chamber then deliberated whether the Trial
v

Chamber, applying the correct test, was “entitled to conclude
that no reasonable trier of fact could find the evidence sufficient
to sustain a conviction, beyond reasonable doubt, for genocide.” The Trial Chamber had found that Jelisić did not have
the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part the Muslim population in the relevant location. The Appeals Chamber disagreed, however, and considered that both the available evidence
and the record, as well as the evidence cited and discussed by
the Trial Chamber in its judgement, “could have provided the
basis for a reasonable Chamber to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the respondent had the intent to destroy the Muslim group” in the relevant location. In short, the Trial Chamber had employed an incorrect test in applying Rule 98bis(B),
and had wrongly terminated the proceedings at the mid-trial
point.
Despite the fact that most of the Prosecution’s grounds for
appeal succeeded, the Tribunal did not grant the Prosecution’s
request for a retrial as a remedy. The Appeals Chamber majority considered a retrial not “in the interests of justice” given the
exceptional circumstances of the case, and declined to reverse
the acquittal on genocide and remit the case to the Trial Chamber. On this point, Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen (Guyana)
and Judge Wald both dissented.
Judge Shahabuddeen expressed his doubts about whether
such “exceptional circumstances” existed. In his view, the majority’s reasons for not remitting the case were either insufficient
or addressed the “concept of judicial economy” rather than the
merits of the case. In addition, reasons of public interest could
be advanced to order a retrial, particularly in a case concerning the crime of genocide.
Judge Wald’s dissent focused on the Tribunal’s authority to
“‘decline . . . to reverse the acquittal,’” for which she found no
support in the ICTY Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, nor in the jurisprudence of national jurisdictions.
Instead, Judge Wald proposed to remand the case to the Trial
Chamber, giving the prosecutor the choice to proceed with a
retrial or to withdraw the genocide charge.
Jelisić appealed his sentence on several grounds. For example, he claimed that the Trial Chamber erred in the exercise of
its discretion by giving insufficient weight to his cooperation with
the Prosecution, his guilty plea, or his youth at the time of the
crimes. Of the totality of the arguments put forward by Jelisić,
the Appeals Chamber only accepted the challenge that the
Trial Chamber erred in finding him guilty of two murders
where the indictment had charged him with, and he had
pleaded guilty to, one murder. Nonetheless, the Tribunal unanimously affirmed his 40-year prison sentence.
Interlocutory Appeals
The Appeals Chamber decided a particularly interesting
interlocutory appeal on May 25, 2001, when it issued its Decision
on Interlocutory Appeal by the Accused Zoran Zigić Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I Dated 5 December 2000 in the Kvocka et al.
(Case No. IT-98-30/1-AR73.5) dealing with the relationship
between the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the ICTY.
Appellant Zoran Zigić, one of the defendants in the Kvocka et al.
case, requested that the ICTY proceedings be suspended while
an ICJ decision was pending on the same or related issues. He
claimed that the relationship between the ICJ as the UN’s principal judicial organ and the ICTY “could be seen as a relationship between the Security Council and the International Court
of Justice as set out in the United Nations Charter.” Like the Trial
Chamber had done before it, the Appeals Chamber dismissed
the interlocutory appeal.
With respect to the question of whether the ICTY is bound
by an ICJ decision on a particular question of law, the Appeals
v

v

continued on next page

29

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 9
ICTY, continued from previous page
v

Chamber quoted from the Celebići Appeals Judgement, which
stated that the “Tribunal is an autonomous internationaljudicial body” and that there is “no hierarchical relationship”
between the ICJ and the ICTY. In the present case, the Tribunal
ruled that there was no legal basis to depart from the conclusion of the Celebići case. It further held that the law did not require
the ICTY to wait for an ICJ decision because ICJ decisions do
not constitute binding precedent on the ICTY. Furthermore,
while acknowledging the significance of ICJ decisions on general questions of international law, the Appeals Chamber held
that the ICTY “has its own competence” and “would consider
any decisions of the International Court of Justice, subject to its
competence to make its own findings.” This could potentially
result in different rulings by the two courts.
v

Contempt Cases
In early 2001, the ICTY issued two appeals judgements in contempt of court proceedings. The first was rendered on February 27, 2001, when the Appeals Chamber issued its Appeal Judgement on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin,
in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77). This
judgement followed an appeal by Milan Vujin, a former counsel in the Tadić case, who had been found guilty of contempt of
court by the Appeals Chamber, ruling in the first instance, on
January 31, 2000. The Appeals Chamber, dismissing the appellant’s appeal, upheld the Appeals Chamber’s judgement in
first instance, and confirmed that Vujin should pay a fine of Dfl.
15,000 (Dutch Guilders) (approximately 6,250 USD). It further
ordered that the Registrar “may consider” striking or suspending Vujin’s name for a certain period of time from the Registrar’s list of eligible counsel who may be assigned to suspects or
accused (Rule 45(B) list of Defence Counsel), and reporting
Vujin to the professional organization to which he belongs.
On June 8, 2001, the Registrar issued his “Decision” in this
matter, and ordered Vujin’s name be withdrawn from the Rule
45(B) list.
Judge Wald dissented on the issue of whether the Appeals
Chamber had jurisdiction in the case. In her opinion, there was
no basis in either the ICTY Statute or the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence to create “a two-tiered system of appeal in cases
such as the one before us, where a finding of contempt has been
initially made by the Appeals Chamber.” Similarly, she concluded that creating a right to appeal an Appeals Chamber
decision was not required in order to avoid violating certain
human rights standards. She found support for this opinion in
the practice of some states that have made reservations to Article 14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and in Article 2 of the Seventh Protocol of the European
Human Rights Convention.
The second case concerning contempt of court proceedings
involved a former counsel in the Aleksovski case. The Trial
Chamber had found Anto Nobilo guilty of contempt of court
in its decision of December 11, 1998, because his disclosure of
certain information constituted a “knowing” violation of an
order of protective measures by the Trial Chamber. In Judgement
on Appeal by Anto Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt of May 30, 2001
(Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR77), the Appeals Chamber allowed
the attorney’s appeal and instructed the Registrar to repay him
the Dfl. 4,000 (Dutch Guilders) (approximately 1,700 USD)
imposed by the Trial Chamber in 1998. In particular, the
Appeals Chamber did not accept the Prosecution arguments that
the Trial Chamber should have found: (1) that Nobilo had
actual knowledge of the protective measures order; or (2) that
there was willful blindness regarding the existence of the order
on the part of Nobilo. 
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* Volume 9, Issues 2 and 3 of the Human Rights Brief will cover the
remaining ICTY judgements of 2001 and the jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda over that same period.
** Cecile E.M. Meijer is the legal coordinator of the War Crimes
Research Office at the Washington College of Law.

ICC Ratifications

Last year the Human Rights Brief reported on
the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and U.S. objections to the
court (Volume 8, Issue 1). The ICC was established pursuant to the Rome Statute and is the
first permanent tribunal to address the crime
of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. During the past year there has
been significant progress in the court’s
formation.
The requisite number of countries has
adopted the Rome Statute, thus enabling the
establishment of the court. The requisite number of countries has not, however, ratified the
ICC. As required under the Rome Statute,
60 countries must ratify the ICC for the court
to enter into force. As of November 2001,
43 countries have ratified the Rome Statute.
Former President Bill Clinton signed the
Rome Statute on the December 31, 2000 deadline, noting U.S. concerns would best be
addressed from inside the process (signing the
Rome Statute permitted the U.S. to continue
negotiating at Preparatory Commission meetings in New York). Clinton did not, however,
recommend Senate ratification. Under the
current Bush administration, ratification
remains an unlikely scenario. The American
Servicemember’s Protection Act (ASPA) poses
a particularly significant obstacle to U.S.
involvement in the court. For more information on the ASPA, please refer to Legislative
Watch on page 34.

